According to the source, talk of an upcoming IBM quantum computing milestone has revived questions about a potential Bitcoin Q-Day, but current public data indicates today’s machines remain far from breaking BTC’s ECDSA signatures (source: publicly available social media post; IBM Research 2023 quantum roadmap). IBM disclosed a 1,121‑qubit Condor processor and utility-scale, error-mitigated results on a 127‑qubit Eagle device in 2023, which are non–fault-tolerant and insufficient for large-scale Shor attacks on ECDSA-secp256k1 (source: IBM Research; Nature 2023 evidence-of-utility paper). Breaking Bitcoin’s ECDSA would require thousands of logical qubits and extremely deep circuits, implying millions of physical qubits at current error rates—well beyond near-term hardware (source: Roetteler et al. 2017 quantum resource estimates; NIST post-quantum cryptography guidance). Bitcoin uses ECDSA over secp256k1 and is vulnerable in principle to Shor’s algorithm once large fault‑tolerant machines exist, while Schnorr (BIP-340) is similarly based on the discrete log problem (source: Bitcoin.org Developer Guide; Shor 1994). For trading, the near-term quantum risk premium to BTC appears low, but headline-driven volatility is possible; monitor IBM Research announcements, NIST/NSA PQC transition timelines starting mid‑2020s, and any Bitcoin Core discussions/BIPs on post‑quantum migration to gauge regime‑shift risk (source: IBM Research updates; NSA CNSA 2.0 memo; NIST PQC transition updates).

According to the source, IBM has publicly demonstrated the 127-qubit Eagle in 2021 and the 433-qubit Osprey in 2022, and unveiled the 1,121-qubit Condor in 2023, as documented in the IBM Research quantum roadmap and announcements. NIST states that cryptographically relevant, fault-tolerant quantum computers do not yet exist and has initiated a multi-year migration to post-quantum standards, per NIST’s Post-Quantum Cryptography standardization updates in 2022 and 2024. For Bitcoin’s secp256k1 ECDSA, resource estimates indicate very large error-corrected qubit counts and long runtimes are required for Shor-based attacks, far beyond today’s devices, per Roetteler et al. 2017 and NIST assessments. In practice, only outputs whose public keys are revealed at spend are directly exposed before any upgrade, while P2PKH, P2WPKH, and Taproot outputs reveal the pubkey only on spending, limiting immediate on-chain attack surface, per the Bitcoin.org Developer Guide.